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Abstract
Tracking Twitter for public health has shown great po-
tential. However, most recent work has been focused
on correlating Twitter messages to influenza rates, a
disease that exhibits a marked seasonal pattern. In the
presence of sudden outbreaks, how can social media
streams be used to strengthen surveillance capacity? In
May 2011, Germany reported an outbreak of Enterohe-
morrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC). It was one of the
largest described outbreaks of EHEC/HUS worldwide
and the largest in Germany. In this work, we study the
crowd’s behavior in Twitter during the outbreak. In par-
ticular, we report how tracking Twitter helped to detect
key user messages that triggered signal detection alarms
before MedISys and other well established early warn-
ing systems. We also introduce a personalized learning
to rank approach that exploits the relationships discov-
ered by: (i) latent semantic topics computed using La-
tent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), and (ii) observing the
social tagging behavior in Twitter, to rank tweets for
epidemic intelligence. Our results provide the grounds
for new public health research based on social media.
1 Epidemic Intelligence Based on Twitter
In May 2011, an outbreak of enterohaemorrhagic Es-
cherichia coli (EHEC) occurred in northern Germany. It was
one of the largest described outbreaks of EHEC/HUS world-
wide and the largest in Germany (Frank et al. 2011).
Day 1: May 19, 2011, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI),
Germany’s Federal Public Health Authority, was invited by
the Health and Consumer Protection Agency in Hamburg to
assist in the investigation of three cases of Hemolytic-uremic
syndrome (HUS), a life-threatening illness caused by EHEC.
Day 2: May 20, alarmed by the type of persons affected and
the rapid spread of EHEC, an investigation was initiated by
RKI, involving all levels of public-health and food-safety
authorities to identify the cause of the outbreak, and to pre-
vent further cases of disease. On day 5: May 23, RKI asked
all health departments to expedite procedures, by immedi-
ately forwarding all case reports of suspected or confirmed
EHEC/HUS, to the Federal Public Health Authority, relying
*A short version of this work has been accepted for publication at
the International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media
(ICWSM 2012).
directly on the diagnoses of notifying clinicians (Frank et al.
2011; RKI ).
Based on this five-day timeline of EHEC/HUS 2011 out-
break in Germany, one can see that public health officials
are faced with new challenges for outbreak alert and re-
sponse. This is due to the continuous emergence of infec-
tious diseases and their contributing factors such as demo-
graphic change, or globalization. Early reaction is necessary,
but often communication and information flow through tra-
ditional channels is slow. Can additional sources of infor-
mation, such as social media streams, provide complements
to the traditional epidemic intelligence mechanisms?
Epidemic Intelligence (EI) encompasses activities related
to early warning functions, signal assessments and outbreak
investigation. Only the early detection of disease activity,
followed by a rapid response, can reduce the impact of
epidemics. Recently, modern disease surveillance systems
have started to also monitor social media streams, with the
objective of improving their timeliness to detect disease
outbreaks, and producing warnings against potential pub-
lic health threats (e.g., (Corley et al. 2010)). The real-time
nature of Twitter makes it even more attractive for public
health surveillance.
Recent works have shown the potential of using Twitter
for public health. These works have either focused on: the
text classification and filtering of tweets (Sofean et al. 2012;
Sriram et al. 2010); or finding predictors for diseases that
exhibit a seasonal pattern (i.e., influenza-like illnesses) by
correlating selected keywords with official influenza statis-
tics and rates (Culotta 2010; Lampos and Cristianini 2010;
Signorini, Segre, and Polgreen 2011). Still others have fo-
cused on mining Twitter content for topic (Paul and Dredze
2011a; 2011b) or sentiment analysis (Chew and Eysenbach
2009). Furthermore, these existing approaches have all fo-
cused on countries where the tweet density is known to be
high (e.g., the UK, or U.S.).
In this paper, we seek to address the issues that can help
deliver a public health surveillance system based on Twitter,
by taking into account two important stages in epidemic in-
telligence: Early Outbreak Detection and Outbreak Analysis
and Control, and take up the following questions:
1. Early Outbreak Detection: Is it possible, by only using
Twitter, to find early cases of an outbreak, before well es-
tablished systems?
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2. Outbreak Analysis and Control: Is it possible to use Twit-
ter to understand the potential causes of contamination
and spread? and How can we provide support for pub-
lic health official to analyze and assess the risk based on
the available social media information?
In contrast, to the aforementioned studies, ours focuses
on a sudden outbreak of a disease that does not involve any
seasonal pattern. Moreover, our work shows the potential of
Twitter in countries where the tweet density is significantly
lower, such as Germany. The contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• We provide an example of the application of standard
surveillance algorithms on Twitter data collected in real-
time during a major outbreak of EHEC/HUS in Germany,
and provide insights showing the potential of Twitter for
early warning.
• For outbreak analysis and control, many studies have been
made for systems that return documents in response to a
query, little effort has been devoted to exploiting learning
to rank in a personalized setting, specially in the domain
of epidemic intelligence. This paper presents an innova-
tive personalized ranking approach that offers decision
makers the most relevant and attractive tweets for risk
assessment, by exploiting latent topics and social hash-
tagging behavior in Twitter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2,
we show how an early warning based on Twitter is possible,
we present the data collection used in our experiments and
analysis, and the standard biosurveillance methods applied.
In Section 3, we introduce a personalized learning to rank
approach, based on Twitter, to support the task of analysis
and control in the presence of a sudden outbreak. Related
works are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we
summarize our findings, point to future directions, and con-
clude the paper.
2 Twitter for Early Warning
The continuous emergence of infectious diseases and their
contributing factors impose new challenges to public health
officials. Early reaction is necessary, but often communi-
cation and information flow through traditional channels is
slow. Additional sources of information, such as social me-
dia streams, provide complements to the traditional report-
ing mechanisms.
For example, if we observe Figure 1 , we can see two
plots, one of them corresponds to the relative frequency of
EHEC cases as reported by RKI (RKI ), and the other to
the relative frequency of mentions of the keyword “EHEC”
in the tweets collected during the months of May and June
2011. We can appreciate the high correlation of the curves,
which corresponds to a Pearson correlation coefficient of
0.864. We can also observe the inertia of the crowd that con-
tinued tweeting about the outbreak, even though the number
of cases were already declining (e.g., June 5 to 11).
Twitter has shown potential as a source of information
for public health event monitoring (e.g., (Paul and Dredze
Table 1: Data collected from Twitter related to the
HUS/EHEC outbreak in Germany during May and
June, 2011.
Description Amount
Number of tweets collected related to
medical conditions during May and June,
2011
7,710,231
Tweets extracted related to the
EHEC/HUS outbreak out of the ones
collected
456,226
Distinct users that produced the tweets re-
lated to the outbreak
54,381
2011b; Sofean et al. 2012)), but could it be possible to gener-
ate an early warning signal before well established systems
by only tracking Twitter?
In this section, we have a closer look to the time period
of the EHEC/HUS outbreak in Germany, and address this
question.
2.1 Data Collection
We incrementally collected tweets using Twitter’s API, cur-
rently we monitor over 500 diseases and symptoms, which
include “EHEC”. One of the challenges we face collecting
data from Twitter, besides the API restrictions, is the level
of noise with respect to medical domain content. Straightfor-
ward techniques relying on regular expressions, even though
they exhibit high recall, are difficult to maintain and prone to
high false positive rates. For example, consider the follow-
ing two tweets collected by a combination of regular expres-
sions, and a dictionary of diseases that includes the medical
conditions EHEC and fever:
1. RKI warns against north German vegetables: Experts
looking feverishly EHEC source http://bit.ly/itGpJx
2. I’ve definitely Bieber-fever. There’s no doubt. but who
hasn’t got bieber fever? @justinbieber is soo damn
rawwwr
Tweet number one is of obvious importance for epidemic
intelligence, but number two is not.
Instead of simple keyword matching to filter out irrelevant
tweets, our data collection strategy includes text classifica-
tion methods and a multi-level filtering based on supervised
learning, following the approach of Stewart et al. (Stewart,
Smith, and Nejdl 2011).
Table 1 summarizes the data collected related to the out-
break that was used in our analysis.
2.2 Detection Methods
The surveillance algorithms we used are well documented in
the disease aberration literature e.g. (Khan 2007; Hutwagner
et al. 2003; Basseville and Nikiforov 1993). The objective
of these algorithms is to detect aberration patterns in time
series data when the volume of an observation variable ex-
ceeds an expected threshold value. In our case, for example,
the observation variable corresponds to mentions of medical
condition “EHEC” withing the tweets.
Date Keyword 
ehec
RKI Cases 
EHEC/
STEC 
Apr 27, 2011 27 0 0.00060132
Apr 28, 2011 28 0 0
Apr 29, 2011 29 0 0.00120265
Apr 30, 2011 30 0 0.00060132
May 1, 2011 1 0 0.00060132
May 2, 2011 2 0 0.00060132
May 3, 2011 3 0 0.00060132
May 4, 2011 4 0 0.00060132
May 5, 2011 5 0 0.00090198
May 6, 2011 6 0 0.00030066
May 7, 2011 7 0 0.00030066
May 8, 2011 8 0 0.00060132
May 9, 2011 9 0 0.00030066
May 10, 2011 10 0 0.00030066
May 11, 2011 11 0 0.00150331
May 12, 2011 12 0 0.00090198
May 13, 2011 13 0 0.00180397
May 14, 2011 14 0 0.00150331
May 15, 2011 15 0 0.00030066
May 16, 2011 16 0 0.00360794
May 17, 2011 17 0 0.00210463
May 18, 2011 18 0 0.00360794
May 19, 2011 19 0 0.00270595
May 20, 2011 20 0.00006 0.00330728
May 21, 2011 21 0.00068426 0.00180397
May 22, 2011 22 0.00262899 0.00300661
May 23, 2011 23 0.01943531 0.04389657
May 24, 2011 24 0.05128328 0.0405893
May 25, 2011 25 0.04017911 0.04389657
May 26, 2011 26 0.08840124 0.04269393
May 27, 2011 27 0.05433243 0.03998797
May 28, 2011 28 0.03330052 0.04149128
May 29, 2011 29 0.02824662 0.04119062
May 30, 2011 30 0.04528103 0.04690319
May 31, 2011 31 0.0465415 0.04149128
Jun 1, 2011 1 0.03932679 0.0460012
Jun 2, 2011 2 0.04091138 0.038184
Jun 3, 2011 3 0.04249598 0.0444979
Jun 4, 2011 4 0.04408057 0.03788334
Jun 5, 2011 5 0.04566517 0.04179194
Jun 6, 2011 6 0.05969845 0.02675887
Jun 7, 2011 7 0.04936256 0.02615755
Jun 8, 2011 8 0.04995078 0.02705953
Jun 9, 2011 9 0.03897866 0.0249549
Jun 10, 2011 10 0.04751387 0.02014432
Jun 11, 2011 11 0.01773067 0.02585689
Jun 12, 2011 12 0.01314494 0.03006615
Jun 13, 2011 13 0.01289285 0.01413109
Jun 14, 2011 14 0.01576193 0.01683704
Jun 15, 2011 15 0.00564212 0.01022249
Jun 16, 2011 16 0.00543804 0.01202646
Jun 17, 2011 17 0.00524597 0.01473241
Jun 18, 2011 18 0.0050419 0.01443175
Jun 19, 2011 19 0.00483782 0.0171377
Jun 20, 2011 20 0.00463374 0.01052315
Jun 21, 2011 21 0.00444167 0.00871918
Jun 22, 2011 22 0.00423759 0.00691521
Jun 23, 2011 23 0.00403352 0.0078172
Jun 24, 2011 24 0.00379343 0.00932051
Jun 25, 2011 25 0.00338527 0.00601323
Jun 26, 2011 26 0.00400951 0.00841852
Jun 27, 2011 27 0.0037214 0.00932051
Jun 28, 2011 28 0.00406953 0.01142514
Jun 29, 2011 29 0.00307316 0.01022249
Jun 30, 2011 30 0.00650645 0.00661455
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Figure 1: Relative frequency of cases reported to RKI and the number of tweets mentioning the name of the disease:
EHEC. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.864. Monitoring Twitter allowed us to generate the first signal on Friday,
May 20th, 2011, using standard biosurveillance methods, before well established early warning systems (triangle on the
time axis).
The five biosurveillance algorithms we used for early de-
tection are: the Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS)
(1) C1, (2) C2, and (3) C3 algorithms, (4) F-statistic, and (5)
Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). Please
refer to (Khan 2007) for a detailed introduction.
We signal an alarm if the test statistic reported by the de-
tection methods exceeds a threshold value, which is deter-
mined experimentally. The larger the amount by which the
threshold is exceeded, the greater the severity of the alarm.
Table 2 summarizes the alarm dates and detection meth-
ods parametrization, which follows the guidelines of N. Col-
lier (Collier 2010).
Using any of the detection methods (Table 2), a daily
count less than five tweets was enough to signal an alert
on May 20th, 2011. The Early Warning and Response Sys-
tem (EWRS) 1 of the European Union received a first com-
munication by the German authorities on Sunday May 22.
MedISys 2 detected the first media report in the German
newspaper Die Welt 3 on Saturday May 21 (Linge et al.
2011) and ProMED-mail 4 and all other major early alert-
ing systems (e.g., ARGUS, Biocaster, GPHIN, HealthMap,
PULS) covered the event on Monday May 23.
Why was this early detection possible with respect to well
established early warning systems? We tracked only Twitter
as source of information, in contrast to MedISys for exam-
ple, that tracks hundreds of news sources on the Internet. We
consider Twitter’s diversity was the key element that helped
1EWRS: ewrs.ecdc.europa.eu
2MedISys: medusa.jrc.it/medisys
3Die Welt: welt.de
4ProMED-mail: promedmail.org
Table 2: Detection method parameters and alarm dates
Detection
Method
Parametrization (Khan
2007; Collier 2010)
Alarm
Dates
C1 Training window = 15 days;
buffer = 5 days; upper control
limit = µ+ 3σ
May 20 to
May 28
C2 Training window = 15 days;
buffer = 5 days; upper control
limit = µ + 3σ; alarm thresh-
old=0.2
May 20 to
May 28
C3 Training window = 15 days;
buffer = 5 days; upper control
limit = µ + 3σ; alarm thresh-
old=0.3
May 20 to
May 24
F-statistic Training window =15 days;
buffer = 5 days; alarm thresh-
old=0.6
May 20 to
June 30
EWMA Training window =15 days;
buffer = 5 days; alarm thresh-
old=4, ω = 0.24
May 20 to
May 30
in the earlier detection of the event.
Twitter is a diverse stream of multiple sources. In Twit-
ter converges the contribution from the crowd - millions of
individual users obscure and renown; big and small media
outlets; global and local newspapers, etc. Our work and that
of MedISys focus on an analysis at a national level, but there
are cases where support for the local perspective is impor-
tant, for example local and smaller news papers reaching a
broader audience through Twitter.
A closer look to day May 20, reveals that the first alarm
was triggered based on five tweets, the actual messages are
shown in Figure 2, all of them generated from sources not
far from where the first cases of the outbreak were reported.
Those users acted as local sensors, producing tweets that
spread the news faster than major newspapers.
Figure 2: The 5 tweets that triggered the first signal for
disease EHEC on May 20, 2011.
3 Twitter for Outbreak Analysis and Control
For public health officials, who are participating in the in-
vestigation of an outbreak, the millions of documents pro-
duced over social media streams represent an overwhelming
amount of information for risk assessment.
To reduce this overload we explore to what extent rec-
ommender systems techniques can help to filter informa-
tion items according to the public health users’ context and
preferences (e.g., disease, symptoms, location). In particu-
lar, we focus on a personalized learning to rank approach
that ultimately offers the user the most relevant and attrac-
tive tweets for risk assessment. In this section, we introduce
our approach and report an experimental evaluation on the
EHEC/HUS dataset collected from Twitter.
3.1 Background: Learning to Rank for IR
Learning to rank for Information Retrieval (L2R) is an ac-
tive area of recent research (Qin et al. 2010). L2R is set
as a supervised learning task that considers fundamentally
two phases: learning and retrieval. In learning (training), a
collection of queries and their corresponding retrieved doc-
uments are given. Furthermore, the labels (i.e., relevance
judgments) of the document with respect to the queries are
also available. The relevance judgments, provided by human
annotators, can represent ranks (e.g., categories in a total or-
der) or binary labels (e.g., relevant or not-relevant). The ob-
jective of learning is to construct a ranking model ~w, e.g.,
a ranking function, that achieves the best result on test data
in the sense of optimization of a performance measure (e.g.,
error rate, degree of agreement between the two rankings,
classification accuracy or mean average precision).
In retrieval (test phase), given a query-document pair,
the learned ranking function is applied, returning a ranked
list of documents in descending order of their relevance
Table 3: Learning to Rank: Summary of Notations
Notations Explanations
Q = {q1, · · · , q|Q|} Set of queries
qi ∈ Q Query
D = {d1, · · · , d|D|} Set of documents
dj ∈ D Document
Y = {y1, · · · , y|Y |} Set of relevance judgments
yij ∈ Y Relevance judgment of
query-document pair
(qi, dj) ∈ Q×D
φ(qi, dj) Feature vector w.r.t. (qi, dj)
φk(qi, dj) k
th dimension of φ(qi, dj)
T = {(qi, dj), φ(qi, dj), yij} Training set
1≤i≤|Q|
1≤j≤|D|
scores. More formally, suppose that Q = {q1, · · · , q|Q|}
is the set of queries, and D = {d1, · · · , d|D|} the set of
documents, the training set is created as a set of query-
document pairs, (qi, dj) ∈ Q × D, upon which a rele-
vance judgment (e.g., a label) indicating the relationship be-
tween qi and dj is assigned by an annotator. Suppose that
Y = {y1, · · · , y|Y |} is the set of labels and yij ∈ Y de-
notes the label of query-document pair (qi, dj). A feature
vector φ(qi, dj) is created from each query-document pair
(qi, dj), i = 1, 2, · · · , |Q|; j = 1, 2, · · · , |D|. The training
set is denoted as T = {(qi, dj), φ(qi, dj), yij}. The ranking
model is a real valued function of features:
f(q, d) = ~w · φ(q, d) (1)
where ~w denotes a weight vector. In ranking, for query qi the
model associates a score to each of the documents dj as their
degree of relevance with respect to query qi using f(qi, dj),
and sort the documents based on their scores.
Table 3 gives a summary of notations described above.
Pairwise approaches, such as Ranking SVM (Joachims
2002) or Stochastic Pairwise Descent (Sculley 2009), have
proved successful in addressing the L2R task. A compre-
hensive study on different learning to rank techniques can
be found in (Liu 2009).
Although much work has been carried out on L2R tech-
niques for systems that return documents in response to a
query, little effort has been devoted to exploiting L2R in a
personalized setting, specially in the domain of epidemic in-
telligence.
3.2 Our Approach:
Ranking Tweets for Epidemic Intelligence
We propose to use the user context as implicit criteria to se-
lect tweets of potential relevance, that is, we will rank and
derive a short list of tweets based on the user context. The
user context Cu is defined as a triple
Cu = (t,MCu, Lu) , (2)
where t is a discrete time interval, MCu the set of medical
conditions, and Lu the set of locations of user interest.
We define three concepts that will help us to discuss our
approach in rest of the section:
Algorithm 1 Personalized Tweet Ranking algorithm for
Epidemic Intelligence (PTR4EI)
Input: User Context Cu = (t,MCu, Lu),
Inverted index T of tweets collected for epidemic intel-
ligence before time t
Output: Ranking Function fCu for User Context Cu
1: Compute LDA topics (topicsLDA) on T
2: Consider each mc ∈ MCu as a hash-tag, and extract
from T all co-occurring hash-tags: coHashTags
3: Classify the terms in topicsLDA and the hash-tags in
coHashTags as Medical ConditionMCx, LocationLx
or Complementary Context CCx
4: Build a set of queries as follows:
Q = {q | q ∈MCu ×P({Lu ∪MCx ∪Lx ∪CCx})}
5: For each query qi ∈ Q obtain tweets D from the collec-
tion T
6: Elicit relevance judgments Y on a subset Dy ⊂ D
7: For each tweet dj ∈ D, obtain the feature vector
φ(qi, dj) w.r.t. (qi, dj) ∈ Q×D
8: Apply learning to rank to obtain a ranking function for
the user context Cu: fCu(q, d) = ~w · φ(q, d)
9: return fCu(q, d)
Medical Condition is a string that describes a human
medical condition, such as a disease, disorder or syndrome.
We represent the set of medical conditions as MC.
Location is a string that is used to identify a point or an
area on the Earth’s surface, which can be mapped to a spe-
cific pairing of latitude and longitude. The set of locations is
denoted as L.
Complementary Context is defined as the set of nouns,
which are neither Locations nor Medical Conditions. Com-
plementary Context may include named entities such as
names of persons, organizations, affected organisms, expres-
sions of time, quantities, etc. We denote the set of named
entities that represents the complementary context as CC,
where CC ∩ (L ∪MC) = ∅.
Out Personalized Tweet Ranking for Epidemic Intelli-
gence algorithm or PTR4EI is shown in Algorithm 1. The
algorithm extends a learning to rank framework (Section 3.1
by considering a personalized setting that exploits user’s in-
dividual context.
More precisely, we consider the context of the user, Cu,
and prepare a set of queries, Q, for a target event (e.g., a dis-
ease outbreak). We first compute LDA (Blei, Ng, and Jordan
2003) on an indexed collection T of tweets for epidemic in-
telligence, where not all tweets are necessarily interesting
for the target event.
We also extract the hash-tags that co-occur with the user
context by considering the medical conditions and locations
in Cu as hash-tags themselves, and find which other hash-
tags co-occur with them within a tweet, and how often they
co-occur, which will help us to select the most representative
Table 4: Four LDA topics (columns) computed weekly
during the main period of the outbreak: from May 23
to June 19, 2011. We classify terms within each topic as
Medical Condition (MC), Location (L), or Complementary
Context (CC).
Week 21
EHEC (MC) fever (MC) EHEC (MC) EHEC (MC)
cucumbers (CC) pain (MC) casualty (-) pathogen (MC)
Spain (L) headache (MC) women (CC) Northern Germany (L)
tomatoes (CC) sniff (MC) intestinal germ (MC) diarrhea (MC)
salad (CC) pain (MC) panic (MC) dead (MC)
Week 22
EHEC (MC) EHEC (MC) EHEC (MC) EHEC (MC)
dead (MC) intestinal germ (MC) cucumbers (CC) cucumbers (CC)
Germany (L) source (-) pathogen (MC) salad (CC)
people (-) search (-) Spain (L) pain (MC)
live (-) Hamburg (L) farmers (CC) women (CC)
Week 23
EHEC (MC) headache (MC) EHEC (MC) EHEC (MC)
cucumber (CC) pain (MC) cucumbers (CC) sprout (CC)
eu (CC) fever (MC) sprout (CC) source (-)
crisis management (-) people (-) pathogen (MC) suspicion (-)
farmers (CC) cough (MC) salad (CC) hus (MC)
Week 24
EHEC (MC) headache (MC) stomach ache (MC) pain (MC)
germ (MC) fever (MC) sniff (MC) bellyache (MC)
sprout (CC) slept (-) pain (MC) cough (MC)
health (MC) sniff (MC) regions (-) throat (CC)
all-clear (CC) head (CC) examined (-) sniff (MC)
hash-tags for the target event.
The set Q is constructed by expanding the original terms
in Cu with the ones in the LDA topics and co-occurring
hash-tags, which are previously classified as medical con-
dition, location or complementary context.
We build the set D of tweets by querying index T using
q ∈ Q as query terms. Next, we elicit judgments from ex-
perts on a subset of the tweets retrieved, in order to construct
Dy ⊂ D.
We then obtain for each tweet dj ∈ D its features vector
φ(qi, dj) with respect to the pair (qi, dj) ∈ Q×D.
Finally and with these elements, we apply a learning to
rank algorithm to obtain the ranking function for the given
user context.
In the rest of the section, we evaluate our approach con-
sidering as event of interest the EHEC/HUS outbreak in Ger-
many, 2011.
Experiments and Evaluation To support users in the
assessment and analysis during the EHEC/HUS outbreak,
we set the user context (Eq. 2) as Cu = (t,MCu, Lu) =
([2011-05-23; 2011-06-19], {“EHEC”}, {“Lower Saxony”}),
in this way, we are taking into account the main period of
the outbreak 5, the disease of interest, and the German state
with more cases reported.
Following Algorithm 1, we computed LDA and extracted
the co-occurring hash-tags using the indexed collection T
described in Section 2.1. Table 4 shows four LDA topics for
each week of the time period of interest, and Table 5 presents
the hash-tags co-occurring with #EHEC.
We asked three experts: one from the Robert Koch Insti-
tute and the other two from the Lower Saxony State Health
5Please note, that even though the main period of the outbreak
is considered for the evaluation, nothing prevents us to build the
model during the ongoing outbreak, and recompute it periodically
(e.g., weekly).
Table 5: Hash-tags co-occurring with #EHEC during
May 23 and June 19, 2011, the main period of the
outbreak. The hash-tags are classified as entities of type
Medical Condition, Location, or Complementary Context,
hash-tags out of these categories are discarded.
Medical Condition Location Complementary Context
Week 21
bacteria bremen cucumber salad cdu
diarrhea cuxhaven cucumbers edeka
ehec victim hamburg ehec vegetable fdp
hus mu¨nster tomatoes merkel
intestinal infection northern germany vegetables rki
Week 22
bacteria berlin cucumbers bild
diarrhea germany obst fdp
ehec pathogen hamburg salad n24
hus lu¨beck terror rki
intestinal infection spain tomatoes rtl
Week 23
bacteria bavaria cucumbers ehec freei
diarrhea berlin salad fdp
ehec pathogen germany sojasprout merkel
hus hamburg sprout n24
intestinal infection lower saxony rki
Week 24
bacteria lower saxony donate blood
died ehec free
health sojasprout
hus
Department (NLGA) 6 to provide their individual judgment
on a subset Dy of 240 tweets, evaluating for each tweet, if it
was relevant or not to support their analysis of the outbreak.
Any disagreement in the assigned relevance scores were re-
solved by majority voting.
We selected these tweets from the index T as follows: 30
were obtained using as query the term “EHEC”, i.e., MCu,
together with the medical conditions identified using LDA,
and 30 using the medical conditions from the hash-tags. We
used a similar procedure combining query “EHEC” with the
locations and complementary context extracted from LDA
and hash-tag co-occurrence, obtaining 30 tweets at every
step, for a total of 120 tweets. For the rest 60, we used the
query term “EHEC” alone, then we ordered the result set
chronologically based on the tweets’ publication date, and
selected the most recent ones.
We prepared five binary features for each tweet as fol-
lows:
Feature Value = True
FMC If a medical condition is present in the
tweet
FL If a location is present in the tweet
F#-tag If a hash-tag is present in the tweet
FCC If a complementary context term is
present in the tweet
FURL If a URL is present in the tweet
For learning the ranking function, we used Stochas-
tic Pairwise Descent (SPD) algorithm (Sculley 2009),
which solves the same optimization problem as Ranking
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SVM (Joachims 2002), but using stochastic gradient de-
scent, whose characteristics make it more appealing to scale
to larger datasets (e.g., (Bottou 2010)).
We compared our approach, that expand the user context
with latent topics and social generated hash-tags, against two
ranking methods:
• RankMC: It learns a ranking function using only medi-
cal conditions as feature, i.e., FMC . Please note, that this
baseline also considers related medical conditions to the
ones in MCu, which makes it stronger than non-learning
approaches, such as BM25 or TF-IDF scores, that use
only the MCu elements as query terms.
• RankMCL: It is similar to RankMC, but besides the med-
ical conditions, it uses a local context to perform the rank-
ing (i.e., features: FMC and FL). We expect this method
to perform better than RankMC, since it does not only
take into account the spatial information from the user
context, but also additional locations in the collection.
We conducted 10-fold cross validation experiments. For
each fold, we used 80% of the tweets for training and the
remaining 20% for testing. The test set is used to evaluate the
ranking methods. The reported performance is the average
over the ten folds.
Evaluation Measures For evaluation, we used three eval-
uation measures widely used in information retrieval,
namely precision at position n (P@n), mean average pre-
cision (MAP), and normalized discount cumulative gain
(NDCG). Their definitions are as follows.
Precision at Position n (P@n) (Baeza-Yates and
Ribeiro-Neto 2011) measures the relevance of the top n doc-
uments in the ranking list with respect to a given query:
P@n =
# of relevant docs in top n results
n
(3)
Mean Average Precision (MAP) The average precision
(AP) (Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto 2011) of a given query
is calculated as Eq. (4), and corresponds to the average of
P@n values for all relevant documents:
AP =
∑N
n=1 (P@n ∗ rel(n))
# of relevant docs for this query
(4)
where N is the number of retrieved documents, and
rel(n) is a binary function that evaluates to 1 if the nth doc-
ument is relevant, and 0 otherwise. Finally, MAP (Baeza-
Yates and Ribeiro-Neto 2011) is obtained averaging the AP
values over the set of queries.
Normalized Discount Cumulative Gain (NDCG) For
a single query, the NDCG (Ja¨rvelin and Keka¨la¨inen 2002)
value of its ranking list at position n is computed by Eq. (5):
NDCG@n = Zn
n∑
j=1
2r(j) − 1
log(1 + j)
(5)
where r(j) is the rating of the the j-th document in the
ranking list, and the normalization constant Zn is chosen so
that the perfect list gets NDCG score of 1.
ROUND P @ 1 P @ 2 P @ 3 P @ 4 P @ 5 P @ 6 P @ 7 P @ 8 P @ 9 P @ 10 MAP
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
allFeatures
AVERAGE
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
mc
AVERAGE
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
AVERAGE
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9000 0.9071
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9805
2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9008
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9074
4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9895
5 1.0000 0.5000 0.6667 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.8411
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9445
7 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.9065
8 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.8206
9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9815
1.0000 0.9500 0.9000 0.9250 0.9400 0.9500 0.9571 0.9625 0.9667 0.9600 0.9180
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7500 0.6000 0.5000 0.4286 0.5000 0.4444 0.5000 0.6471
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8740
2 1.0000 0.5000 0.6667 0.5000 0.6000 0.6667 0.7143 0.7500 0.7778 0.8000 0.7470
3 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 0.5000 0.6000 0.5000 0.5714 0.6250 0.6667 0.6000 0.6560
4 1.0000 0.5000 0.6667 0.5000 0.4000 0.5000 0.5714 0.6250 0.6667 0.7000 0.6719
5 1.0000 1.0000 0.6667 0.7500 0.6000 0.5000 0.4286 0.5000 0.5556 0.5000 0.5762
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.8226
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.4000 0.5000 0.5714 0.5000 0.5556 0.5000 0.6772
8 1.0000 0.5000 0.6667 0.7500 0.6000 0.6667 0.7143 0.6250 0.6667 0.6000 0.7024
9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.8000 0.8218
0.9000 0.7500 0.7334 0.6750 0.6400 0.6500 0.6714 0.6875 0.7111 0.6900 0.7196
0 1.0000 0.5000 0.3333 0.5000 0.6000 0.6667 0.7143 0.7500 0.6667 0.7000 0.7149
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.9056
2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8571 0.8750 0.7778 0.8000 0.8294
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8000 0.6667 0.7143 0.7500 0.6667 0.7000 0.7721
4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8570
5 1.0000 0.5000 0.3333 0.5000 0.6000 0.6667 0.7143 0.7500 0.7778 0.8000 0.7018
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8967
7 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8889 0.9000 0.8356
8 0.0000 0.5000 0.6667 0.7500 0.8000 0.8333 0.8571 0.7500 0.7778 0.8000 0.7704
9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8333 0.8571 0.8750 0.8889 0.9000 0.8983
0.9000 0.8500 0.8333 0.8750 0.8800 0.8667 0.8714 0.8625 0.8334 0.8500 0.8182
ROUND NDCG @ 1 NDCG @ 2 NDCG @ 3 NDCG @ 4 NDCG @ 5 NDCG @ 6 NDCG @ 7 NDCG @ 8 NDCG @ 9 NDCG @ 
10
AVERAGE 
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AVERAGE
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
mc_loc
AVERAGE
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9427 0.9442
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9890
2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9410
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9470
4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9937
5 1.0000 0.5000 0.6199 0.6806 0.7192 0.7467 0.7677 0.7844 0.7981 0.8097 0.8245
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9680
7 1.0000 1.0000 0.7602 0.7985 0.8229 0.8402 0.8534 0.8640 0.8726 0.8799 0.9048
8 1.0000 1.0000 0.7602 0.7985 0.8229 0.8402 0.8534 0.8640 0.8726 0.8799 0.8513
9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9906
1.0000 0.9500 0.9140 0.9278 0.9365 0.9427 0.9475 0.9512 0.9543 0.9512 0.9354
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8403 0.7387 0.6663 0.6112 0.6391 0.5984 0.6214 0.7001
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9182
2 1.0000 0.5000 0.6199 0.5209 0.5788 0.6201 0.6515 0.6766 0.6972 0.7145 0.7282
3 1.0000 1.0000 0.7602 0.6388 0.6825 0.6156 0.6474 0.6728 0.6936 0.6539 0.6968
4 1.0000 0.5000 0.6199 0.5209 0.4579 0.5110 0.5515 0.5837 0.6102 0.6326 0.6654
5 1.0000 1.0000 0.7602 0.7985 0.7019 0.6332 0.5808 0.6109 0.6357 0.5993 0.6686
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8791 0.8909 0.9000 0.9071 0.9131 0.9180 0.8789
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1597 0.2613 0.3337 0.3888 0.3609 0.4016 0.3786 0.5262
8 1.0000 0.5000 0.6199 0.6806 0.5983 0.6377 0.6676 0.6197 0.6439 0.6070 0.6915
9 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8403 0.8596 0.8734 0.8838 0.8922 0.8991 0.8476 0.8714
0.9000 0.7500 0.7380 0.7000 0.6758 0.6782 0.6883 0.6963 0.7093 0.6973 0.7345
0 1.0000 0.5000 0.3801 0.4791 0.5421 0.5869 0.6211 0.6484 0.6071 0.6296 0.6850
1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9281 0.9327 0.9366 0.9352
2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9173 0.9232 0.8644 0.8722 0.8880
3 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8791 0.7929 0.8101 0.8237 0.7713 0.7844 0.8355
4 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9159
5 1.0000 0.5000 0.3801 0.4791 0.5421 0.5869 0.6211 0.6484 0.6707 0.6896 0.7006
6 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9376
7 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9363 0.9400 0.8907
8 0.0000 0.5000 0.6199 0.6806 0.7192 0.7467 0.7677 0.7125 0.7308 .7462 0.7496
9 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 .9020 .9101 .9166 .9219 .9264 .9340
.9000 .8500 .8380 .8639 .8683 .8615 .8647 .8601 .8435 .8525 0.8472
RankMC   (baseline)
RankMCL (baseline)
PTR4EI
MAP NDCG@1 NDCG@3 NDCG@5 NDCG@10
0.7196 0.9000 0.7380 0.6758 0.6973
0.8182 0.9000 0.8380 0.8683 0.8525
0.9180 1.0000 0.9140 0.9365 0.9512
Method P @ 1 P @ 3 P @ 5 P @ 10
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PTR4EI
0.9000 0.7334 0.6400 0.6900
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1.0000 0.9000 0.9400 0.9600
0
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0.40
0.60
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1.00
MAP NDCG@1 NDCG@3 NDCG@5 NDCG@10
Ranking Performance : MAP and NDCG@{1, 3, 5, 10}
RankMC   (baseline) RankMCL (baseline) PTR4EI
Figure 3: MAP and NDCG Results
Table 6: Ranking Performance in terms of P@{1, 3, 5, 10}
Method P@1 P@3 P@5 P@10
RankMC (baseline) 90 % 73.34 % 64 % 69 %
RankMCL (baseline) 90 % 83.33 % 88 % 85 %
PTR4EI 100 % 90 % 94 % 96 %
For the training dataset, we define two ratings {1, 0} cor-
responding to “relevant to the outbreak” and “not-relevant
to the outbreak” in order to compute NDCG scores.
Results The ranking performance in terms of precision
is presented in Table 6, MAP and NDCG results are
shown in Figure 3. As we can appreciate PTR4EI outper-
forms both baselines. Local information helps RankMCL
to beat RankMC, for example MAP improves from 71.96%
(RankMC) up to 81.82% (RankMCL). PTR4EI, besides lo-
cal features, exploits complementary context information
and particular Twitter features, such as the presence of hash-
tags or URLs in the tweets, this information allows it to
improve its ranking performance even further, reaching a
MAP of 91.80%. A similar behavior is observed for preci-
sion and NDCG, where PTR4EI is statistically significantly
better than RankMC and RankMCL.
4 Related Work
In order to detect public health events, supervised (Stew-
art, Smith, and Nejdl 2011), unsupervised (Fisichella et al.
2011) and rule-based approaches have been used to extract
public health events from social media and news. For ex-
ample, PULS (Steinberger et al. 2008) identify the disease,
time, location and cases of a news-reported event. It is in-
tegrated into MedISys, which automatically collects news
articles concerning public health in various languages, and
aggregates the extracted facts according to pre-defined cate-
gories, in a multi-lingual manner.
Other systems have sought to use the web and social me-
dia as a predictor to monitor and gauge the seasonal patterns
of influenza. These systems correlate the queries used in
search behavior with the infection rates of influenza-like ill-
nesses statistics (Polgreen et al. 2008; Ginsberg et al. 2009).
Monitoring analysis has also been carried out on Twitter.
The work of Chew et al. focused on the use of the terms
“H1N1” and “swine flu” during the H1N1 2009 outbreak
(Chew and Eysenbach 2009). They showed that the con-
cise and timely nature of tweets can provide health officials
with the a means to become aware, and respond to concerns
raised by the public.
Culotta applied text classification to filter out tweets that
are not reporting about influenza-like illnesses. Further, they
modeled influenza rates by regression models and compared
to U.S. Center of Disease Control statistics (Culotta 2010).
Lampos and Cristianini also presented a monitoring tool
for social media that is based on the textual analysis of
micro-blog content (Lampos and Cristianini 2010), (Lam-
pos, Bie, and Cristianini 2010). Their study focused on
influenza-like illnesses in the UK and showed a correlation
with data from the Health Protection Agency. Another study
of Twitter content concentrated on influenza-like illnesses
in the U.S. (Signorini, Segre, and Polgreen 2011). Paul and
Dredze (Paul and Dredze 2011a; 2011b) introduced a new
aspect topic model for Twitter that associates symptoms,
treatments and general words with diseases. Their focus is
on general public health, not necessarily infectious diseases
or disease outbreaks.
In contrast to these systems, we seek to not only detect
and monitor potential public health threats, but also provide
support for public health officials to asses the potential risk
associated with the volume of information that is available
within Twitter streams. Moreover, our proposed approach
shows the potential of using Twitter for monitoring non-
seasonal outbreaks in and geo-spacially sparse tweet loca-
tions.
Our work is similar to that of (Linge et al. 2011), were
media reports on the 2011 EHEC outbreak in Germany are
tracked. Although in their work no early warning was possi-
ble, they identified key aspects of developing outbreak sto-
ries. In contrast to this work, our approach exploits social
media data and we show that a system can help to get early
warnings on public health threats.
Although some works exist that address the task of rank-
ing tweets, little effort has been devoted to explore person-
alized ranking of tweets in the domain of epidemic intel-
ligence. For example Duan et al. rank individual generic
tweets according to their relevance to a given query (Duan
et al. 2010). The features used include content relevance
features, Twitter specific features and account authority fea-
tures. In contrast, our is a personalized learning to rank ap-
proach for epidemic intelligence, that exploits an expanded
user context by means of latent topics and on social hash-
tagging behavior.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
To show the potential of Twitter for early warning, we fo-
cused on the recent EHEC/HUS outbreak in Germany, and
monitor the social stream. We applied several biosurveil-
lance methods on a set of tweets collected in real time dur-
ing the time of the event using Twitter API. All the detection
methods triggered an alarm on May 20, a day ahead of well
established early warning systems, such as MedISys.
After the detection of the outbreak, authorities investi-
gating the cause and the impact in the population were in-
terested in the analysis of micro-blog data related to the
event. Thousands of tweets were produced every day, which
made this task overwhelming for the experts. We proposed
in this work a Personalized Tweet Ranking algorithm for
Epidemic Intelligence (PTR4EI) that provides users a per-
sonalized short list of tweets that meets the context of their
investigation. PTR4EI exploits features that go beyond the
medical condition and location (i.e., user context), but in-
cludes complementary context information, extracted using
LDA and the social hash-tagging behavior in Twitter, plus
additional Twitter specific features. Our experimental evalu-
ation showed the superior ranking performance of PTR4EI.
We are currently working closely with German and global
public health institutions to help them integrate the monitor-
ing of social media to their existing surveillance systems.
As future work, we plan to scale up our experiments, and
to apply techniques of online ranking in order to update the
model more efficiently as the outbreak develops.
We have shown the potential of Twitter to trigger early
warnings in the case of sudden outbreaks and how personal-
ized ranking for epidemic intelligence can be achieved. We
believe our work can serve as a building block for an open
early warning system based on Twitter, and hope that this
paper provides some insights into the future of epidemic in-
telligence based on social media streams.
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